Empire, War and Nation: Heritage Management Perspectives from Canada and Malta by Tunbridge, John
  
EMPIRE, WAR AND NATION: 
HERITAGE MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES FROM 
CANADA AND MALTA 
 
 
JOHN TUNBRIDGE 
 
 
 
PUBLIC HISTORY REVIEW, VOL 13, 2006, PP4-22 
 
 
decade ago, Tunbridge and Ashworth1 claimed that all heritage is 
dissonant: it is someone's, expressing some value, and is accordingly not 
someone else's, expressing some other. As such it may be contested and 
bears the potential for conflict. The dissonance of heritage may arise from all 
manner of causes, among them the spatial scale at which it is perceived, the 
agencies involved in its perception, the nature of its marketing, the political 
ideology it reflects and (merely the best known) the cultural identity it projects. 
Our claim of inherent dissonance has been widely accepted and not, to our 
knowledge, contradicted. It would seem to follow, therefore, that cultural heritage 
management is a dicey business – not for the faint-hearted! That said, conflict 
may not be obvious. Even when its innate potential is realised, it may be subtle, 
unspoken, deviously evaded and unrecorded. It may, of course, be anything but: 
Bamyan in Afghanistan is just one recent and dramatic example of the violence 
accorded throughout history to the 'false idols' of someone else's religious 
heritage. 
This article need not reinvent the wheel. It offers instead some recent 
insights on our topic from Canada and Malta, the former being relatively well 
known to the heritage literature while the latter is not. They represent two 
contrasting geographical extremes which span a range of conflict issues with 
which heritage managers may be confronted. None of these are of the Bamyan 
variety; they are generally at the level of newspaper-column conflict, if that, but 
the management problem may be thorniest where civility has not been lost and 
may yet be productively sustained. 
Canada and Malta have one critical heritage dimension in common, with 
each other and also with New Zealand and Australia: they are successor states of 
the British Empire and as such share linguistic and historical familiarity. Thus the 
postcolonial basis for heritage conflict, well recognised by Tunbridge and 
Ashworth,2 Boniface and Fowler3 among others, is centrally placed. It is important 
to note, however, that the perception of the colonial heritage is free of the 
excoriation which often emanates from postcolonial theorists. Its management is 
complex and equivocal in both Canada and Malta: they illustrate subtleties that 
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exist, and which can be encountered more widely, over attitudes to the colonial 
heritage, which may be conflictual but by no means involve the simplistic hostility 
which is often assumed (for example by Edensor and Kothari).4 
The present article fits this collection primarily with respect to the dissonance 
between colonising and indigenous heritage meanings, which are powerfully 
implicated in contests over status and control of resources as others discuss 
here. There are noteworthy parallels between such heritage conflicts and their 
management in Ottawa and in Australian and New Zealand cities. The 
association with revitalising waterfronts is particularly intriguing: the longstanding 
issue of social equity in the appropriation of this rediscovered resource has 
acquired a particular aboriginal slant in Ottawa, Perth (below) and current 
developments in Wellington. 
However, another, related, postcolonial theme is particularly apposite at this 
time. Recent commemoration of the ninetieth anniversary of Gallipoli was a 
pointed reminder, particularly in Australasia, of the Empire at war. The sixtieth 
anniversary of VE Day has further reconjured this heritage, notably in Ottawa, 
where the opening of a spectacular new Canadian War Museum has been timed 
to coincide. Furthermore in the author's recent research on Malta the British 
wartime heritage association has been inescapable. To the successor states of 
the British Empire this has variously meant comradeship in arms, national 
identification, centrifugal recrimination and perhaps much else; it has been 
subject to changing perception as it has been harnessed to the ebb and flow of 
political agendas. 
A particular focus of this article is the Empire at war as an issue of heritage 
management in Ottawa, as the capital of Canada, and in Malta: how does it 
compare and contrast, how far is it the subject of conflict, and by extension what 
insight might this discussion provide for the management of the same heritage in 
other imperial successor states? It goes without saying that New Zealand and 
Australia have their own long-established and well articulated heritage 
perspectives on the world wars, though like all heritages these are not immutable. 
Singapore has recently promoted its own wartime heritage, notably the day of its 
fall in the 'Battle Box' (Battle HQ Malaya Command); for it the parallel but 
antithesis of Malta, the island fortress that prevailed, is particularly poignant. 
 
CANADA AND THE ROLE OF OTTAWA 
The defining quality of Canada, for the present discussion, is its abundance of 
space but lack of perceptual time-depth. (Of course the native peoples have an 
ancient heritage identification with the land but for all its present political potency 
it has few tangible time markers). It has been eminently placed to acquire a 
cultural diversity of heritage resources, most of which are temporally shallow by 
world standards, but which can prompt rival claimants to the 'real' heritage of 
Canada just as easily as they can weave interdependent heritage threads. The 
rapidity of immigration in recent decades has turned Canada's heritage definition 
into a moving target, an evolving identity susceptible to changing interpretation in 
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which political expediency has played no small part. Note that it is clearly ahead 
of New Zealand and Australia in this respect, judging by 2001 population 
statistics. 
The story of Canada's evolution from a British through an Anglo-French to an 
officially multicultural identity is well documented, with the interpretation of its 
United Empire Loyalist co-founders changing chameleon-like along the way (see 
Tunbridge and Ashworth,5 among many others). However, this multicultural 
identity is dependent on the scale of its perception: it is credible at the national 
level and in Ottawa, the federal capital charged with its formulation, but less so on 
a provincial basis and much less so at the local level except in the major cities 
(Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver) which are overwhelmingly the destination of 
immigrants. Quebec is the best known source of provincial dissonance over 
multicultural heritage identity: its francophone majority have tended to see 
multiculturalism as a betrayal of Canada's former Anglo-French compact, 
reducing them to just one ethnicity among many, while the 'separatistes' among 
them fear demographic inundation by the multicultural tide in Montreal. The 
Atlantic Provinces remain predominantly Anglo-French, and Newfoundland is 
outstanding by virtue of its recent and equivocal adhesion to Canada (1949) and 
an Anglo-Irish identity 'purer' than any likely to be found in England or, soon, in 
Ireland. Indeed the resilience of British, monarchical and even imperial symbolism 
in this, the first overseas British colony, is striking; the bilingualism and 
multicultural references in Newfoundland's federally run National Historic Sites 
were slow to acquire credibility. 
Canada, however, is committed to a multicultural heritage identity even 
where it is inappropriate or questionable; and even if it is nationally contested 
both by former hegemons who fear marginalisation (especially anglophones in 
Western Canada) and by recent minorities who fear trivialisation or protest that 
they came to Canada to discover its heritage rather than add their own to a 
coreless global mosaic. It is in Ottawa that the multicultural enterprise is focused 
and finds in the National Capital Commission an agency with the mandate to give 
it iconographic expression. Indeed the NCC's commitment to (re)design a capital 
expressive of Canadian diversity is more broadly multilateral: to the inclusion of 
all elements of society however defined, particularly those omitted from the 
narrative in the past. This is widely perceived to be anyone other than able-
bodied, heterosexual, WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) males; though 
francophone equivalents might now also wonder about their standing in Ottawa's 
Canadian pantheon. 
Ottawa's evolving heritage identity bears frequent re-examination. The 
NCC's national heritage mandate is focused upon the urban core, which includes 
the centre of both Ottawa proper and what is now Gatineau across the Ottawa 
River. To understand the context it is necessary to remember that Canada has no 
federal district but a capital city formally in Ontario which has been effectively 
extended to include the Quebec side of the metropolitan area (1,100,000 overall), 
within the framework of a rather tenuous National Capital Region sustained by  
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Central Ottawa and Hull. Canadian War Museum now displaces Ottawa River Parkway 
(relocated to south) (Photograph C Earl, Geography, Carleton University 1997) 
 
strategic federal land-ownership. This extends far into the rural and recreational 
fringe but its symbolic focus is the central area broadly defined by Confederation 
Boulevard, the national ceremonial route, a circuit inaugurated in 2000 around 
mainly pre-existing streets which bonds the dual city centre (Figure 1). 
The national iconography has been developing on Parliament Hill and nearby 
Confederation Square for over a century, long before a bi-provincial NCR, let 
alone a ceremonial circuit, was conceived; in fact before the first federal agency 
was mandated to nurture and beautify the capital identity. Inevitably, therefore, it 
includes monuments from Canada's period as an autonomous British Dominion, 
the original symbolism of which could engender conflict since it is now obsolete, 
possibly offensive to some or simply no longer comprehended. Some of these 
monuments have pride of place in a limited federal core area, in which the NCC is 
in active negotiation with various contending parties for the creation of a new 
iconography considered, by its protagonists at least, to reflect the very different 
Canada of today. The question inevitably arises: what to do with the old in 
accommodating the new? 
Canada, however, is no postcolonial latecomer characterised by instant 
glorifications of independence, empty colonial plinths and indiscriminate street-
name changes. Canada was in fact the model for orderly constitutional evolution 
to independence, in pointed contrast to its revolutionary neighbour to the south. It 
retains a strong conservative constituency to whom historic identities remain 
important and whose provocation would be imprudent. It has grown beyond its 
external identity crisis of thirty-plus years ago: it is now a mature liberal 
democracy distinct from the former colonial power, with which it maintains 
relations of cordial equality, and divergent from the prevailing social and political 
vision of its US neighbour. It is also a notably courteous society which 
characteristically eschews rude affronts both at home and abroad. Against this 
largely implicit background it is not surprising that the NCC's management of its  
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Indian scout in Major's Hill Park, Ottawa, removed from Champlain Monument (behind); 
Canadian Museum of Civilization background left (Photograph J.E. Tunbridge, 2002) 
 
inherited iconography is one of  cautious evolution, involving retention, reimaging, 
reaction to placate where necessary and reconfiguration of context by current 
additions. It is, however, a process of conflict management rather than conflict 
elimination. 
Thus Queen Victoria stands on Parliament Hill where she was placed over a 
century ago, in one of the most strikingly imperial of her ubiquitous 
representations, with daughter Canada offering her a wreath in tribute. Her 
longevity has been helped by peripheral placement: true to Canada's evolutionary 
tradition, the early forces of independence nudged her out of a proposed central 
site. She is also reimaged, in the NCC's tourism literature at least, away from the 
traditional imperial figure to one who presided over decades of peaceful national 
progress. 
Conflict arose over another colonial-era monument, however, which required 
the NCC's reactive adjustment.6 On a bluff overlooking the Ottawa River stands a 
larger-than-life representation of its European discoverer, Champlain. At his feet, 
for most of the past century, crouched his diminutively represented Indian scout. 
By the millennium, leaders of the Indian First Nations found it politically timely to 
demand the scout's removal as demeaning to their people. Champions of both 
the sculptor and the statue, a prominent Ottawa landmark, were predictably 
incensed. After an extended prevarication, for which the structural stresses 
induced by the changing Canadian seasons provided an initial excuse, the NCC 
removed the Indian several hundred metres to a still-intervisible site, provided 
him with a title, and cross-referenced him with Champlain as the work of the 
same sculptor, without indicating their longstanding co-location. Thus was conflict 
substantially defused,  
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Aboriginal War Veterans' Memorial, Elgin Street, Ottawa 
(Photograph J.E. Tunbridge, 2002) 
 
unknown to new visitors or the young; and without, as yet, opening the floodgates 
to demands for other changes to existing iconography. 
In the creation of new national monuments, the redress of Indian/Aboriginal 
under-representation remains a prominent issue. It is fortunately easier to deal 
with than other sectional heritages, for the First Nations alone have an 
unequivocal claim to specific identification; in contrast, in Ottawa's national 
iconographic space, the global spectrum of latecomers can only be generically 
represented by 'minimalist' commemoration of ideals and values. Aboriginal war 
veterans have recently been honoured with a monument which unsubtly, if 
beautifully, appropriates icons of the Canadian natural environment. The 
Canadian Museum of Civilization gives more prominent permanent 
representation to the First Nations than to the French and distinctly more than to 
the British;7 and Aboriginal mis/underrepresentation has also been countered 
among its rotating displays.8 
The most substantial First Nations representation currently awaits 
construction, and will break new global ground in giving primacy to Aboriginal 
heritage in waterfront revitalisation, unlike an otherwise close comparison in 
Perth, Australia.9 The Ottawa River islands were the industrial nucleus of 
European  
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Peacekeeping Monument. Node on Confederation Boulevard, Ottawa 
(Photograph J.E. Tunbridge, 2002) 
 
settlement in the area and the NCC aspires to their revitalisation in the 'industrial 
aesthetic'. However, this provoked conflict to the extent that an Indian group 
protested by squatting for several years in the ruins of an early mill – no small 
feat in the Ottawa winter which may drop to minus thirty degrees Celsius. They 
claimed primacy for Aboriginal heritage on Victoria Island, which had served as 
an inter-tribal meeting ground before European contact. In due course the NCC 
acceded to their demand for a First Nations cultural centre, which is likely to be 
the first and most prominent component in the revitalisation of the islands; 
however despite compromise acceptance of the dissonant mill structure within 
their design, their architect continues to press for its elimination on pretext of 
cost.10 In other words heritage conflict continues, in one of its many subtle (more 
or less) manifestations. 
The multiplicity of cultures and social groups cannot generally aspire to such 
specific recognition except in rotating displays in the CMC. The main exception is 
women: concern to redress their systematic underrepresentation as such has led 
to specific monuments, both involving some conflict; one memorialising women 
as victims of violence, from ceremonies at which the protagonists sought male 
exclusion, and another honouring pioneers of women's rights which created 
controversy by its siting on Parliament Hill, hitherto reserved for strictly political 
figures. Achievement in disability is also recognised by the figure of a nationally 
famous one-legged runner, moved from its original site for greater visibility near 
Parliament. Otherwise, new iconography accepted by the NCC, from many  
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National War Memorial, Confederation Square, Ottawa. D-Day fiftieth anniversary march past 
(Photograph J.E. Tunbridge, 1994) 
 
proposals, reflects further values it seeks to ascribe to the now diverse Canadian 
society. The Peacekeeping Monument ('Reconciliation') which counterparts the 
War Memorial (below), and the Tribute to Human Rights, sacralised by a 
presidential farewell visit by Nelson Mandela, have been discussed elsewhere 
(see Gough,11 Tunbridge and Ashworth,12 Roberts).13 It is worth reiterating here, 
however, that the former was an uneasy compromise between the NCC and the 
very different resourcing agenda of the Department of National Defence, a 
reminder that conflict over heritage exists not only at different levels and in 
different guises, but between contending stakeholders in the production of 
heritage as well as in its consumption. 
Peacekeeping raises the more fundamental question of war memorials – 
specifically those monumental echoes of the British Empire at war which are 
ubiquitous throughout its successor states.  In Ottawa, the Boer War memorial 
received uncharacteristic attention during the observance of the centennial, at 
which its meaning was reconsidered, for Canada particularly as its first (and 
notable) overseas military accomplishment. The National War Memorial, in 
physical contrast, still dominates Confederation Square at the main junction in the 
ceremonial route; it has however gradually undergone a complex image 
metamorphosis from imperial to national. Its imperial beginning, created by a 
British sculptor and entitled 'The Response', clearly resonated when it was finally 
unveiled in 1939, by King George VI himself, in a ceremony portending another 
call to arms. The national agenda stirred in the First World War was greatly 
intensified in the Second, and postwar Remembrance Day commemorations 
gradually nationalised the memorial's emphasis until, in 2000, an unknown soldier 
was reinterred there from the quintessentially Canadian battlefield of Vimy Ridge 
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(1917), to a high degree of national consensus. However the imperial echo 
reverberates still, especially in the ceremonial imagery of Remembrance Day. 
Ottawa's current expression of the theme of this paper has just appeared in 
the relocated Canadian War Museum, opened on the sixtieth anniversary of VE 
Day on a prominent riverfront site and destined to play a central role in the city's 
waterfront revitalisation and tourist-historic development. It develops the theme of 
imperial to national evolution, emphasising Canadian contribution and cost but 
without rancour over perceptual imperial errors, noting for example that the heavy 
losses of the Dieppe raid (1942) constituted a failure of central planning in the 
view of some. Controversial issues and continuing questions are so indicated, but 
the tone of the exhibits is one of progression to a well earned independent 
postcolonial identity which has culminated in a respected international role as 
impartial UN peacekeeper. The presentation belies earlier conflict, however, 
associated partly with CWM's subordinate relationship with the CMC: but those 
who wanted it recast as a Holocaust museum or purged of reference to enemy 
atrocities have clearly failed to overcome the priorities of veterans. Its opening 
exhibition of war art staged jointly with the Australian War Memorial and the 
Imperial War Museum was an interesting statement of shared memory. 
In postcolonial terms, the national heritage of peace and war as projected by 
Ottawa might be described as a graceful evolution away from its imperial past, in 
which dissonances are managed by discreet silences and, where appropriate or 
necessary, by the pragmatic adjustments noted above. Quiet ambivalences 
persist, but the conflicts over heritage that do indeed require continuous 
management are seldom a head-on collision between colonial and contemporary 
national imagery. In large measure this is because Canada has grown beyond 
the stage where the colonial heritage is a threat or even an irritant, as it may still 
be seen at times in Australia and New Zealand. But the legacy of the colonial era 
also remains a useful distinction from the US, in terms both of the colonial 
ideological inheritance of 'peace, order and good government' in preference to 
'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness', and of its nationally iconic and tourist-
marketable heritage of all those champions of the law in red coats and (with 
occasional cultural exceptions) boy-scout hats. 
 
THE CASE OF MALTA 
In sharp contrast to Canada, the defining quality of Malta's heritage resources is 
their unparalleled time-depth contained in a tiny archipelago some fifty kilometres 
long. Malta contains the oldest standing human structures in existence, Neolithic 
temples some five and a half millennia in age. In its small space there is a series 
of World Heritage Sites which span from Neolithic to Renaissance. Again in 
contrast to Canada, its cultural heritage resource 'problem' is not perceived 
scarcity  
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Malta: Gozo located northwest; Dockyard Creek, marked by icon, faces Valletta across 
Grand Harbour (RMF Publicity and Surveys Ltd, Malta, 2003) 
 
but overwhelming abundance, in a microstate environment of very limited 
financial resources with which to maintain, let alone restore them. This has 
imposed choices as to which heritages should be favoured over other options. 
The issue has become of pressing importance as Malta is faced with growing 
external competition and internal environmental stress in the 'blue' tourism field, 
which has largely sustained it through its postcolonial evolution from Britain's 
premier imperial naval base.14 In consequence it is now turning to 'grey' heritage 
tourism, cultivating a more elite tourism patronage which can be distributed more 
widely across space and seasons, but which consumes heritage relatively rapidly 
and is doing so in many other places pursuing a similar strategem.15 Thus Malta 
cannot afford to make mistakes in the selection and marketing of heritages. 
In practice the heritage choice comes down to which eras should be 
favoured. Therein lies the focus of conflict, more or less subtle and largely a 
matter of verbal debate between stakeholders, no doubt particularly within the 
confines of the Malta Tourism Authority, the principal agency concerned, which 
has a relative importance to national planning out of all proportion to larger states 
with more diversified economies. The predominantly preferred eras16 are the 
Neolithic; and the Renaissance period under the Knights of St.John, who built the 
image-making cores of the urban centres and much else, above all the existing 
fortifications of Grand Harbour, culminating in the massively fortified city of 
Valletta (now a World Heritage Site) after successful resistance against a Turkish 
siege. However, the first is problematical since it must largely be presented as 
mystery, inconceivably remote from present concerns, and is furthermore too 
fragile to sustain heavy tourism flows. In contrast there is a third compelling 
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heritage resource which is clearly within living memory and relevance and is also 
abundant and robust: the British colonial heritage. 
Thus Malta, like Canada, cannot avoid the postcolonial tripwire. 
Unsurprisingly this is an equivocal heritage, but for reasons distinctly different 
from Canada's or for that matter New Zealand's or Australia's, which should 
compel us to take more discriminating stock of the colonial legacy as a heritage 
resource than the postcolonial literature is wont to do. Malta, like Canada, 
maintains cordial relations with Britain in part because the colonial relationship, 
though in general quite different, was equally in general quite benign. This in no 
way questions the prime need of any formerly colonial state to demonstrate its 
independence by moderating its exploitation of the colonial heritage resource; 
indeed the political forces which brought Malta to independence and the later 
termination of the British base were not short on postcolonial rhetoric which 
deepened equivocation over the colonial legacy.17 However this belies the facts: 
Malta became a British dependency at its own request; it found economic 
prosperity for over 150 years through the naval base employment, albeit with 
periodic downturns which were ultimately terminal; and its loyalty to Britain 
climaxed in a heroic shared defence which constitutes a heritage resource of 
titanic proportions, leaving a legacy of goodwill, often indeed affection, at the 
interpersonal level between the Maltese and British. 
The context, of course, was the Second World War; and here we find a 
striking contrast with another British imperial fortress. In 1942 Singapore fell, but 
Malta held: a heritage perception perhaps of shame and recriminatory divergence 
is contrasted with one of pride and congratulatory consociation among the 
imperial legatees concerned. Indeed Singapore was one reason why Malta had to 
hold, at fearful cost in warships, Spitfires and much else, besides over 7000 lives. 
The 1950s film Malta Story is not the propaganda it might appear but a literal 
account of an epic of Maltese-British endurance, shared in the larger 
Mediterranean theatre by Canadians and ANZACs among others. At issue was 
Malta's strategic ability to interdict Axis north-south convoys to North Africa while 
minimally maintaining Allied east-west communication: it was ferociously 
contested for nearly three years and ultimately sustained by a hair's breadth. The 
Maltese survived unprecedented bombing, focused on the naval dockyard, in a 
labyrinth of underground shelters. Well remembered episodes include the 
underwater repair of the carrier HMS Illustrious by Maltese dockyard workers 
during aerial bombardment; King George VI's unparalleled award of the George 
Cross to the 'Island Fortress of Malta'; and at last the arrival in August 1942 of the 
remnants of Operation Pedestal, hardest-fought of the Malta convoys, with just 
enough food to save Malta from starvation until the fuel rescued from its sinking 
tanker Ohio ensured the destruction of Rommel's supply-line and his defeat at El 
Alamein.18 
A stirring hinge of fate indeed: like it or not, it asserts Malta's two sieges as 
the most marketable products of its many heritage resources. The Great Siege of 
1565, in which the Knights of St.John and the Maltese successfully held out 
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against the Ottoman Empire and thereby saved western Europe from Turkish 
sea-borne invasion, is vigorously promoted as the colourful centre-piece of the 
Knights' era; Malta's defence of Europe through a pan-European military order 
has a particular heritage resonance at this present time of Malta's accession to 
the European Union. To this the Greater Siege of 1940-1943 would appear to be 
the ideal complement, securing for Malta a unique heritage identity as stalwart 
defender of monumental global causes. 
If the Great Siege might now emit a frisson of dissonance over its implied 
defence of European Christendom, the Greater Siege is however a more complex 
problem of heritage management and marketing for a variety of reasons. The first 
is the paradox of its living-memory time-depth: it is at once the most immediately 
relevant yet the least credible heritage resource for a society which, unlike 'new 
world' settler societies, perceives its history in millennia. More generally it can be 
difficult to persuade even some professional colleagues in Malta to take the 
British colonial heritage seriously, whatever they may think of it: there is just too 
much of it, it is at most 200 years old, and how do you get excited about 
defending Victoriana (now belatedly happening in the old residential suburb of 
Sliema) when you have Neolithics and Knights on your mind, not to speak of your 
purse? Thus diffidence, rather than conflict, may cloud the management of 
heritage resources of which potential managers, as well as local consumers, are 
daily living the legacy. This diffidence can extend not only to the naval/military 
history, but to its eminently marketable wartime apotheosis. 
The standard postcolonial conflict over heritage associations with former 
overlords is not a major issue. Ironically this is not because it is absent but 
because it can be concealed. Notwithstanding voluntary association, cordiality 
and loyal comradeship, predictable resentments chiefly on the left of the political 
spectrum have found heritage expression. However, they are expressed in 
Maltese, which unlike Italian (in elite/official use before 1940) is an Arabic-root 
language wholly indecipherable to any non-Maltese. Thus a 'martyrs' monument 
coexists peaceably in Valletta's central square with colonial-era plaques in 
English on the wall of the Grandmaster's Palace (of the Knights, later 
Government House and independent Parliament); and the Freedom Monument, 
whence the Royal Navy departed in 1979, displays a cordial flag transition 
ceremony and handshake irrespective of its inscription. Language cannot of 
course sidestep the visual evidence of respect for colonial buildings, but one 
cannot ascribe their sometimes indifferent reuse and condition to disregard, in 
view of their abundance and perceived recency, and the pragmatic reuse needs 
and paucity of restoration resources of a postcolonial microstate. Certainly the 
original uses of major colonial buildings and (very extensive in Malta) the colonial 
reuses of Knights' structures are often acknowledged in English, albeit not as 
consistently as a systematic heritage development would require. 
The British naval heritage has however created a conflict, or at least a 
particular mental block; unfortunate in that Malta was the premier British overseas 
naval base  
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'Faith', minus wings. Malta War Museum, in Fort St.Elmo, at end of Valletta peninsula 
(Photograph J.E. Tunbridge, 2002) 
 
 
Dockyard Creek. Malta Maritime Museum, centre. Freedom Monument in square to right. 
Fort (HMS) St.Angelo left, Valletta far left (Photograph J.E. Tunbridge, 2004) 
 
and its heritage resources are more than equal to successful tourist-historic 
revitalisations such as the Royal Naval Dockyard in Bermuda (see Ashworth and 
Tunbridge,19 Tunbridge).20 The reasons, however, are transparent. It was the run-
down of the base that ultimately obliged Malta to seek a tourism economy and it  
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Dockyard Creek: on-site marina map. Malta Maritime Museum 
mid-right shore, drydock ensemble at head of creek 
(Photograph J.E. Tunbridge, 2004) 
 
 
Siege Memorial, Valletta, Malta. Overlooking Grand Harbour, Fort St.Angelo and dockyard 
(right). Siege Bell tower behind viewpoint (Photograph J.E. Tunbridge, 2003) 
 
requires some mental gymnastics to return full circle to see the naval heritage as 
the champion of that very economy. This is particularly the case when Malta still 
bears the imprint of the less romantic naval reality: the dockyard core remains a 
workaday commercial industrial environment, Malta's service standards were long 
impaired by the fortress legacy, job losses were resented and postwar dockland 
reconstruction was often substandard.21 However, the naval heritage has a major 
if partly oblique place in the War Museum, which houses the George Cross along 
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with 'Faith' (survivor of legendary biplane defenders Faith, Hope and Charity), 
and in the Lascaris War Rooms which preserve the Mediterranean wartime 
command centre deep within Valletta's walls (equivalent to Singapore's Battle 
Box). Furthermore Dockyard Creek in Grand Harbour, historic focus of both the 
Knights' and British naval base, is now in process of revitalisation; while this is 
mainly for a marina and casino, which notes but has removed British 
modifications of Knights buildings, the British naval bakery has been adaptively 
reused as the Malta Maritime Museum, interpreting the British naval heritage 
generously. The original British drydock and adjacent composite Knights'/British 
buildings are also in the public review process for tourist-leisure adaptive reuse, a 
process to which the author has been privileged to contribute. 
The civilian-focused heritage of the Second World War, from which the 
colonial dimension is inseparable, has found recent expression in the Siege 
Memorial, co-dedicated by Queen Elizabeth, and the Malta at War Museum 
which interprets an underground rock shelter network. Furthermore the quest for 
new heritage products within the national means is beginning to draw upon the 
colonial heritage more widely, civilian and particularly military.22 One current 
initiative of the Malta Tourism Authority is 'Countryside Walks', which by their 
nature in a mainly warm island need to exploit all wayside stops of interest. A 
noteworthy case is centred on the Victoria Lines, a rearward defence of the naval 
base which was built on an escarpment running across northern Malta and, with 
its supporting forts, creates a landscape feature as indelible as the various 
Knights' watchtowers which dot the coastline. 
Wholehearted public management and marketing of the British heritage, 
particularly that of the Second World War, is however impeded by a fundamental 
problem. International consultants have advised against selling a fortress identity, 
with its negative associations, to tourism;23 even though such opinions may be 
changing with evolving heritage tastes, a problem of marketing the wartime 
heritage now confronts Malta. The British market has long been at ease with the 
fortress legacy, of which many were formerly part, and is obviously empathetic to 
the wartime associations. But Malta's tourism makeover must include maximum 
diversification, away from a largely blue-collar British sun/sea market to a more 
sophisticated international heritage market, notably including the Italians and 
Germans; and how do you sell the wartime heritage to those who at that time 
tried to throttle you? Clearly not by stressing close association with the then 
British military presence. Market segmentation in linguistically varied tourism 
literature can ameliorate the problem but a heritage conflict remains, particularly 
since the principal medium of communication with visitors is inevitably English, 
which for Malta remains a lucrative second language in which all Maltese are 
more or less fluent. A certain coyness over the British connection is routine in the 
postcolonial condition, if only because the zeitgeist is seen to require it; in Malta's 
particular tourism situation, however, it is hardly surprising. 
The management consequence of postcolonial heritage foot-shuffling, 
whether or not it amounts to overt conflict, is predictable. What government won't, 
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or can't, do will be done by individuals who are passionately committed to the 
neglected heritage cause; such individuals typically materialise as heritage NGOs 
thus dedicated. This pattern has been observed with respect to the colonial 
military heritage in Trinidad, Bermuda, Newfoundland and Malta24 and is echoed 
in Singapore and no doubt more widely. In Malta's case, the champion is Mario 
Farrugia, president of Fondazzjoni Wirt Artna (one of two Malta Heritage Trusts), 
who specialises in restoration of colonial military and wartime heritage resources, 
notably Fort Rinella's 100-ton gun which defended Grand Harbour's entrance, 
and the Malta at War Museum documenting the 'home front' experience. This 
management solution is logical for heritage which might be dissonant to some: 
the onus is removed from public agencies (here the Malta Tourism Authority), 
whose tourism-generating purpose is nonetheless served by some degree of 
assistance – if never enough! – to the NGO; while the NGO provides a specialist 
resource, to be called upon for purposes ranging from a supply of Redcoats for 
historic festivals to guiding visiting academics with esoteric research interests. 
Thus Malta's postcolonial heritage perspectives involve degrees of distinction 
from those of Canada, despite the parallels which include perception of utility in 
the colonial heritage, lack of overt hostility to it, even more or less equivocal 
regard for it. Paradoxically, a much older society is much more recently 
postcolonial and has lacked the time to work out its view of the British legacy – a 
process which may now be overtaken by the new British relationship of 
partnership in the European Union. Furthermore the enduring advantage to 
Canada of its colonial heritage in respect to the third party south of its border is 
contrasted with an equivalent disadvantage to Malta in its growing third party 
dealings with neighbours to the north. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has discussed a range of heritage issues in two case areas central to 
the author's current work. Comparison of heritage issues in Ottawa, Canada and 
in Malta clearly involves a range of markedly contrasting circumstances. 
Perceived differences of space and time are fundamental; the two societies are, 
respectively, recently multicultural and longstandingly unicultural (although an 
amalgam of diverse human elements over time). Their financial resources are 
radically different; likewise their cultural sensitivities, respectively to a growing 
diversity of residents and a needed diversification of visitors. Heritage conflicts 
and management mechanisms differ with these and other variables: questions of 
whose heritage, using which resources of what period, for whose benefit, and 
how managed (if at all) involve a different range of answers in the two cases. 
Nevertheless they are potentially conflictual in both, as they are likely to be in 
other cases for which still different arrays of answers may be debated. In the 
present cases there is a prime commitment to heritage development for citizens 
and visitors respectively; and its management is more comprehensively 
dominated by national government in Ottawa than in Malta. Management 
techniques, whether recognised or not, include linguistic manipulation: Malta has 
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a distinctive language advantage, but it serves Canada also since French 
translations can be more creative than even most Canadians realise. Market 
segmentation is a standard technique for the management of heritage 
dissonance, commonly assisted by language (though less effectively with the 
growing universality of English). Management of course requires a wider 
methodology, however, notably in dealing with obsolete iconographic messages 
as in Ottawa. 
Heritage conflict potential and its management in the cases discussed are 
inseparable from the postcolonial condition. Inevitably the coexistence of colonial 
heritage with evolving national identity raises questions and perhaps tensions. 
But national identity in successor states of the British Empire is incomprehensible 
without reference to the colonial heritage, even where the society was largely 
shaped beforehand, as in Malta; indeed Britain's own identity and the English 
language itself are inexplicable without reference to its own colonisation from 
overseas. British colonial heritage is, however, too diverse within and between 
places to be value-generalised. Its utility is demonstrably flexible across space: it 
serves some external dealings well but others ill. It is also mutable over time and 
the changing political agendas that come with it. Ultimately there can be no 
single, immutable colonial heritage or postcolonial identity; contemporary 
appropriation of the colonial experience to fit a preconceived social ideology is 
thus liable to obfuscate rather than illuminate the issue. This in no way invalidates 
the generation of comparative insights between cases, which may however 
emerge in unexpected contexts such as the waterfront dimension of aboriginal 
heritage recognition noted in the above introduction. 
Since its wartime 'finest hour' was also its swansong, the Empire at war is 
one of the predominant themes of the colonial heritage and often the cutting edge 
in the evolution of succeeding national identities. It is a theme that bears closer 
examination. In Canada, the military and resource contribution of two world wars 
created the conviction of nationhood and set the country on the difficult path of 
defining national identity in the face of internal Anglo-French dichotomy and 
external British versus US influences; an identity ultimately achieved through 
multicultural primacy and recent US divergence, though not without regional 
differences over the process. Malta, however, had found profit in earlier wars and 
ultimately a glory in the Second World War which enhanced its pre-existing 
national identity, as the George Cross in its flag, its philately and wider 
iconography bears witness. 
New Zealand and Australia bear their own well known national imprints from 
the imperial heritage of war, most fully articulated in Wellington and particularly in 
the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. Singapore's current heritage narratives 
of its wartime catastrophe range from Japanese atrocity to the selfless dedication 
of the Malay Regiment as an undisguised national example; they may imply the 
further political message of self-reliance in the face of its potentially hostile 
regional climate today.25 Other imperial successor states have their own changing 
heritages of war, however. For example, in 1998 an ANC guide on South Africa's 
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infamous Robben Island stirred considerable heritage dissonance among his 
audience – the author not most – by dismissing the island's Second World War 
gun installations (defending Cape Town) as a distraction from the real heritage of 
South Africa's postcolonial/apartheid liberation, which Robben Island is now 
deemed to represent. 
Irrespective of these themes of the present paper, there remains a 
widespread tendency to regard heritage as a value-neutral attribute altruistically 
determined by unbiased agents motivated by unassailable ideals. Such a vision is 
not unnatural among those who are professionally responsible for the 
conservation of resources from the past and who regard their motives as above 
reproach. But if we accept that all heritage is subject to dissonance, therein lies 
the potential for conflict and the necessity for management to avoid or to contain 
it. As if the bases for dissonance noted in this essay were not enough, there will 
likely be dissonances in the transmission of heritage messages, both 
intergenerational as implicit above and, more fundamentally, within the same time 
period. A message transmitted does not equal a message received, something 
which is amazingly still forgotten by authors who should know better – or perhaps 
choose not to for their own ideological reasons.26 For many reasons, therefore, 
heritage is not the soft and fluffy beast we might wish it to be; not least, 'the 
management of the past as a resource in conflict'27 has political implications. 
We noted at the outset that heritage conflict is often a matter of subtlety. From the 
perspective of dissonance, we might more precisely say that its ubiquitous 
potential may not develop but often surfaces as subtle tensions which, if not 
managed, can become overt conflict; to the detriment of all concerned. 
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